Skip to main content
Version: main

ADR 007: Pause validator unbonding during equivocation proposal

Changelog​

  • 2023-05-16: Initial Draft
  • 2023-11-30: Change the status to rejected

Status​

Rejected

Context​

Note: ADR rejected as the equivocation proposal was removed by the cryptographic verification of equivocation feature (see ADR-005 and ADR-013).

Currently, if an equivocation slashing proposal is created after more than one week has passed since the equivocation, it is possible that the validator in question could unbond and get away without being slashed, since the unbonding period is 3 weeks, and the voting period is 2 weeks. For this reason, it might be good to pause unbondings for validators named in an equivocation slashing proposal until the proposal's voting period is over.

Decision​

How​

Pausing the unbonding period is already possible thanks to the changes in the staking module of the cosmos-sdk:

  • stakingKeeper.PutUnbondingOnHold pauses an unbonding period
  • stakingKeeper.UnbondingCanComplete unpauses an unbonding period

These methods use a reference counter under the hood, that gets incremented every time PutUnbondingOnHold is called, and decreased when UnbondingCanComplete is called instead. A specific unbonding is considered fully unpaused when its underlying reference counter reaches 0. Therefore, as long as we safeguard consistency - i.e. we make sure we eventually decrement the reference counter for each time we have incremented it - we can safely use this existing mechanism without conflicts with the Completion of Unbonding Operations system.

When pause​

The unbonding period (if there is any unbonding) should be paused once an equivocation proposal enters the voting period. For that, the gov module's hook AfterProposalDeposit can be used.

If the hook is triggered with a an equivocation proposal in voting period, then for each equivocation of the proposal, the unbonding operations of the related validator that were initiated after the equivocation block time must be paused

  • i.e. the underlying reference counter has to be increased.

Note that even after the voting period has started, a proposal can receive additional deposits. The hook is triggered however at arrival of a deposit, so a check to verify that the proposal is not already in voting period is required.

When unpause​

We can use a gov module's hook also here and it is AfterProposalVotingPeriodEnded.

If the hook is triggered with an equivocation proposal, then for each associated equivocation, the unbonding operations of the related validator that were initiated between the equivocation block time and the start of the proposal voting period must be unpaused - i.e. decrease the underlying reference counter - regardless of the proposal outcome.

Consequences​

Positive​

  • Validators subject to an equivocation proposal cannot finish unbonding their tokens before the end of the voting period.

Negative​

  • A malicious consumer chain could forge slash packets enabling submission of an equivocation proposal on the provider chain, resulting in the freezing of validator's unbondings for an undeterminated amount of time.
  • Misbehavior on a consumer chain can potentially go unpunished, if no one submits an equivocation proposal in time, or if the proposal doesn't pass.

Neutral​

  • This feature can't be used for social slashing, because an equivocation proposal is only accepted if there's a slash log for the related validator(s), meaning the consumer chain has reported the equivocation to the provider chain.

References​